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1455 
PREEMPTION AND REMOVAL: WATSON SHUTS 
THE FEDERAL OFFICER BACKDOOR TO THE 
FEDERAL COURTHOUSE, CONCEALS 
FAMILIAR MOTIVE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A group of plaintiffs sues a large national corporation in state court for 
violating state law. The corporate defendant responds that even if it did 
violate state law, it is not liable because federal law or a relevant federal 
regulatory agency authorized or directed the allegedly illegal conduct. But 
before arguing that the supremacy of federal law and regulation preempts 
the state claim, the corporate defendant invariably removes the case to 
federal court.
1
 If the corporate defendant cannot establish diversity 
jurisdiction, however, the Supreme Court‘s narrow interpretation of the 
federal question jurisdiction statute and its strict application of the well-
pleaded complaint rule make the task of keeping the case in federal court 
nearly impossible. Following remand, a state judge ultimately decides 
whether federal law or regulation preempts the state claim against the 
corporate defendant. 
Given this jurisdictional milieu, corporate defendants eager to escape 
the state courts vigilantly try to sneak into the federal courthouse through a 
backdoor after finding the front door closed. Recently, cigarette maker 
Philip Morris found one such backdoor in the federal officer removal 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
2
 Indeed, Philip Morris succeeded not only 
at the district court level,
3
 but also convinced a panel of the Eighth Circuit 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., Fred J. Meier et al., Federal Officer Removal: Watson Would Fly With FAA 
Designees, 72 J. AIR L. & COM. 485 (2007).  
Aviation manufacturers are confronted with a fifty-state patchwork quilt of tort laws and 
procedural rules when litigation involves their products. The national and international scope 
of the aviation industry, the extreme mobility of their products, and jurisdictional rules 
generally subject aviation manufacturers to being haled into the local courts of any of the fifty 
states to answer lawsuits, regardless of whether the manufacturer has a physical presence in a 
given state. The alternative to being a stranger in a state court forum is to seek transfer to the 
presumably more neutral playing field of the United States District Court. 
Id. at 486. 
 2. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2000). 
 3. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 4:03-CV-519 GTE, 2003 WL 23272484 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 
12, 2003). 
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to unanimously affirm the district court‘s denial of plaintiffs‘ remand 
motion.
4
  
On its face, the federal officer removal statute permits removal of state 
claims against officers or agencies of the United States as well as persons 
―acting under‖ those officers or agencies. Historically, individuals and 
corporations unaffiliated with the government scarcely used this narrow 
jurisdictional statute. When they did, the defendants were federal 
contractors facing suits for activities performed under the direction of the 
United States pursuant to a contract.
5
 Philip Morris was the first corporate 
defendant to successfully argue that because the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) regulated and authorized its actions that allegedly 
violated state law, Philip Morris was a person ―acting under‖ an agency of 
the United States entitled to federal jurisdiction under § 1442(a)(1). This 
backdoor did not stay open for long, however, as a unanimous Supreme 
Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that a corporation simply 
complying with federal regulation, no matter how detailed or specific, 
could not defend state law claims in federal court under the federal officer 
removal statute.
6
 
This Note has two primary goals. The first goal is to highlight the 
underlying jurisdictional issues that were not apparent on the face of any 
of the three Watson v. Philip Morris Cos.
7
 opinions. Specifically, the 
lower courts‘ acceptance of Philip Morris‘s argument for federal officer 
jurisdiction created a rule that could potentially result in removal under 
§ 1442(a)(1) of any case where a defendant asserted a conflict preemption 
defense based on extensive federal regulation. This decision circumvented 
established Supreme Court doctrine and carved a new exception into the 
well-pleaded complaint rule. In addition, if left untouched, the decision 
 
 
 4. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 420 F.3d 852 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 5. See, e.g., Crackau v. Lucent Techs., No. Civ. 03-1376 (DRD), 2003 WL 21665135 (D.N.J. 
June 25, 2003). Radar technicians sued the manufacturer of radar devices for exposure to radiation. Id. 
at *1. Because the radar system was developed for the U.S. Army, and because the Army controlled 
the training given to technicians and the wording in the radar safety manuals, the Crackau court 
concluded that the government controlled the defendant‘s activities and federal officer jurisdiction 
existed. Id. at *5; see also Pack v. AC & S, Inc., 838 F. Supp. 1099, 1103 (D. Md. 1993) (holding that 
workers injured in the construction of turbines built according to detailed government specifications 
and subject to government testing amounted to ―direct and detailed control‖ sufficient to create federal 
officer jurisdiction). But see Good v. Armstrong World Indus., 914 F. Supp. 1125, 1128 (E.D. Pa. 
1996) (finding that defendant was ineligible to remove under § 1442(a)(1) because it had not produced 
turbine generators ―according to the direct and detailed control of an officer of the United States, rather 
than at the general direction of an agency or other governmental department‖). 
 6. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 127 S. Ct. 2301, 2310 (2007). 
 7. 2003 WL 23272484; 420 F.3d 852; 127 S. Ct. 2301. 
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had the potential to seriously alter the balance toward federal regulatory 
preemption of private enforcement of state law.  
The second goal is to analyze the Supreme Court‘s reasons for 
reversing the lower courts. This Note explains why the three principal 
rationales the Court used to support reversal—history, plain language, and 
statutory purpose—undermine rather than bolster the Court‘s decision. 
Ultimately, the Note concludes that just as with the Court‘s development 
of the well-pleaded complaint rule in the context of interpreting the federal 
question jurisdiction statute, practical concern over the expansion of the 
federal docket drove the Court‘s narrow reading of the federal officer 
removal statute. 
II. THE FRONT DOOR TO THE FEDERAL COURTHOUSE: STATUTORY 
FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND REMOVAL 
A. Divergence Between the Constitutional and Statutory Interpretations of 
Federal Question Jurisdiction 
Before delving into the history and judicial treatment of the federal 
officer removal statute prior to and during Watson‘s ascent to the Supreme 
Court, it is important to briefly address some fundamental principles of 
federal jurisdiction. That federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction is 
an oft-heard truism for both students and practitioners of the law.
8
 Article 
III of the United States Constitution created the Supreme Court, authorized 
Congress to create inferior federal courts, and defined the extent of judicial 
power that those courts could exercise.
9
 Among the bases of subject matter 
jurisdiction
10
 enumerated in Article III, the most prominent in 
contemporary civil litigation are the ubiquitous diversity jurisdiction
11
 and 
federal question jurisdiction.
12
 The development and application of 
 
 
 8. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 41 (5th ed. 2007). In perhaps the 
leading treatise in the field of federal jurisdiction, Professor Chemerinsky begins Part I of his work by 
noting that ―[i]t is frequently stated and widely accepted that federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction.‖ Id. By contrast, state courts are courts of general jurisdiction; they can hear any judicially 
cognizable dispute without explicit authorization of jurisdiction. Id. at 265. Growing from this maxim 
of limited federal jurisdiction is the presumption that federal jurisdiction does not exist unless proven 
by the person seeking jurisdiction. Id. at 267. 
 9. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 12.  
 10. ―Subject matter jurisdiction is the legal authority of a court to hear and decide a particular 
type of case. . . . [F]ederal courts have limited subject matter jurisdiction; that is, they are restricted in 
what cases they may adjudicate and may exercise jurisdiction only if it is specifically authorized.‖ 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 265. 
 11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000). 
 12. See id. § 1331. 
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diversity jurisdiction is comparatively straightforward (and also less 
relevant for the upcoming analysis in light of the introductory 
hypothetical),
13
 so the focus of the rest of this section and this Note will be 
federal question jurisdiction.
14
 
Article III, Section 2 is the source of federal question jurisdiction and 
provides that the federal judicial power ―shall extend to all Cases . . . 
arising under . . . the Laws of the United States.‖15 While Congress 
exercised its Article III, Section 1 power and created inferior federal courts 
by enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, it did not confer statutory federal 
question jurisdiction upon those inferior courts until 1875.
16
 By that time, 
the Supreme Court already had occasion to interpret the ―arising under . . . 
the Laws of the United States‖ language in the Constitution.17 In Osborn v. 
Bank of the United States,
18
 the Court adopted an extremely broad reading 
of the ―arising under‖ language when it held that the mere possibility that 
a question of federal law would be an important ingredient in litigation 
satisfied Article III requirements.
19
 
 
 
 13. The operative word in this sentence is comparatively. Diversity jurisdiction has its own 
panoply of complications. For example, while Article III, Section 2 authorizes federal diversity 
jurisdiction over ―Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States,‖ the statutory grant of 
diversity jurisdiction has been construed to require complete diversity: that no plaintiff and no 
defendant can be from the same state. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806).  
 14. In my discussion throughout the rest of this Note, I will assume the unavailability of removal 
by way of diversity of citizenship. At any rate, plaintiffs that bring state court claims against corporate 
defendants are typically sophisticated enough to join a nondiverse party so as to defeat diversity 
removal.  
 15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 16. See Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–
1332 (2000)).  
 17. In Osborn v. Bank of the United States, a federally chartered bank sued to recover tax money 
seized by a state treasury for taxes, claiming that the bank was exempt under federal law. 22 U.S. (9 
Wheat.) 738, 739–44 (1824). While the suit was based on state law, the bank sued in federal court 
because a federal statute authorized the bank to sue and be sued in federal court. Id. at 805, 807. The 
state defendant challenged whether this statutory grant of jurisdiction arose under federal law for 
purposes of Article III. Id. at 744–45. 
 18. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738. 
 19. The Court reasoned that though in most cases involving the bank the only disputed issues 
would depend on state law, the fact that the bank‘s legitimacy and capacity to act depended on federal 
law, and could thus conceivably be challenged in any case, was enough to confer federal question 
jurisdiction under Article III. Id. at 805. ―The breadth of Chief Justice Marshall‘s interpretation of 
federal question jurisdiction in Osborn cannot be overstated. According to his opinion for the Court, 
the Constitution permits Congress to create federal court jurisdiction whenever federal law is a 
potential ingredient of a case.‖ CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 277–78. Despite widespread criticism, 
Osborn continues to be good law. See Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 492 (1983) 
(explaining that ―[t]he controlling decision on the scope of Art. III ‗arising under‘ jurisdiction is Chief 
Justice Marshall‘s opinion for the Court in Osborn v. Bank of the United States‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/4
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While the language of the modern federal question jurisdiction statute, 
28 U.S.C. § 1331,
20
 is nearly identical to the constitutional ―arising under‖ 
language, the Court interprets the statutory grant of jurisdiction much 
more narrowly. In fact, a question ―arises under‖ federal law for purposes 
of § 1331 only when: (1) federal law creates the plaintiff‘s cause of 
action;
21
 or (2) state law creates the plaintiff‘s cause of action but federal 
law is an essential component of the case, and the outcome depends on the 
construction or application of that federal law.
22
 Together, these 
limitations define the boundaries of what has become widely known as the 
well-pleaded complaint rule—the requirement that the federal question 
must appear on the face of a well-pleaded complaint to trigger § 1331 
jurisdiction.
23
 
A corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule is that a federal defense 
cannot give rise to § 1331 jurisdiction, regardless of whether a defendant 
first raises the defense, or the plaintiff anticipates the defense and 
addresses it in the complaint.
24
 An increasingly common federal 
 
 
 20. That section reads: ―The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions 
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000). 
 21. This is often referred to as Justice Holmes‘s cause of action test. See Am. Well Works Co. v. 
Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916). While this was the predominant statement of the law 
on statutory federal question jurisdiction for a long time, it proved to be too narrow. See Franchise Tax 
Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983) (noting that ―Holmes‘ test is more 
useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the district courts‘ original 
jurisdiction than it is for describing which cases are beyond district court jurisdiction‖). 
 22. See Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921) (finding statutory federal 
question jurisdiction existed for a state law injunction that depended entirely on the validity of bonds 
issued under federal law); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng‘g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 
314–15 (2005) (finding that federal question jurisdiction existed for a state quiet title action where the 
only ―disputed and substantial‖ issue was the sufficiency of a seizure notice issued by the IRS under 
federal law). But see Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986) (finding no federal 
question jurisdiction over a state tort claim where the cause of action made the violation of a federal 
law into a presumption of negligence, even though violation of federal law was disputed and 
potentially critical to the outcome). 
 23. Nothing in part (2) in the preceding sentence requires that the essential and determinative 
federal question appear in the complaint, which raises the question of whether the well-pleaded 
complaint rule is properly named. Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that while the well-pleaded 
complaint rule ―makes sense as a quick rule of thumb,‖ it ―may produce awkward results.‖ Franchise 
Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 11, 12. Still, the Court continues to use the rule and calls it a ―powerful doctrine.‖ 
Id. at 9. Some mental gymnastics can resolve this minor dilemma if one accepts that a well-pleaded 
complaint would certainly mention an essential and determinative federal law.  
 24. See Tennessee v. Union & Planters‘ Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894) (holding that a federal 
defense asserted by the defendant does not create federal jurisdiction, even if the plaintiff anticipates 
the defense in his complaint, and even if the defendant asserts that defense thereafter); Louisville & 
Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (holding that the federal claim must be asserted 
by the plaintiff as part of the affirmative theory of relief; rebutting a defense by raising a federal 
question does not create federal jurisdiction). 
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defense
25—the one raised in the introductory hypothetical—is federal 
preemption of state law.
26
 Broadly described, preemption is a doctrine 
grounded on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.
27
 Article VI 
proclaims that federal law shall be the supreme law of the land, and that 
state judges shall be bound by federal law, anything to the contrary in state 
law notwithstanding.
28
 An extension of this constitutional principle is that 
when Congress enacts a law with the explicit intent to change or supplant 
state law, a state judge must abide by that federal law even if doing so 
forecloses a plaintiff‘s relief for a defendant‘s violation of state law.29 In 
addition to congressional ability to expressly preempt state law through 
statutory language, both federal law and federal regulation can preempt 
inconsistent or contrary state law by implication.
30
 While it is the stated 
doctrine of both the state and federal judiciary to avoid finding conflict 
between federal and state law whenever possible,
31
 when courts do find 
 
 
 25. See, e.g., Joseph F. Zimmerman, Congressional Preemption: Removal of State Regulatory 
Powers, 38 POL. SCI. & POL. 375, 376–78 (2005). The author attributes the rise in preemption as a 
response to  
(1) the failure of states by means of interstate cooperation to solve many multistate problems, 
including air and water pollution; (2) the ineffectiveness of conditional grants-in-aid in 
eliminating national problems; (3) the general failure of states to enact harmonious regulatory 
policies; (4) lobbying by industries, such as the motor vehicle industry, burdened with 
increasing nonharmonious state regulatory policies.  
Id. at 376. 
 26. See generally JAMES T. O‘REILLY, FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 
(2006). 
 27. The Supremacy Clause reads: ―This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which 
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority 
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be 
bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.‖ 
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 28. Id. 
 29. This is called express preemption and occurs when Congress passes a statute that expressly 
spells out that it intends to preempt all or certain parts of state law and regulation on the subject. See 
O‘REILLY, supra note 26, at 51–59. 
 30. See id. at 65–78. Implied preemption occurs in the absence of any express congressional 
provision. Id. at 65. There are several different types of implied preemption. The first, field 
preemption, occurs when a court determines that even absent an express provision, Congress intended 
to occupy the field and to exclude all state regulation on the subject matter. Id. at 69–72. The second 
type of implied preemption, conflict preemption, encompasses two situations. In instances of actual 
conflict between state and federal law, the federal law is said to preempt any conflicting state law. Id. 
at 72. Conflict preemption also covers situations where even absent a direct conflict, the ―regulatory 
objectives‖ of the state and federal governments are incompatible. Id. In cases of conflict preemption, 
the Supremacy Clause ―nullifies‖ the state law in favor of the federal law. Id. This Note is concerned 
primarily with the second type of implied preemption—conflict preemption. 
 31. See, e.g., Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, No. 07-562, slip op. at 6 (Dec. 15, 2008). ―When 
addressing questions of express or implied pre-emption, we begin our analysis ‗with the assumption 
that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.‘‖ Id. at 543 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/4
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such conflicts, the conflict preemption doctrine requires displacement of 
state law in favor of federal law.
32
 
B. Practical Implications of the Divergent Interpretations for Litigants, 
and State and Federal Governments 
At the intersection of the well-pleaded complaint rule and the implied 
conflict preemption doctrine lies the question of true practical significance 
for our hypothetical corporate defendant—can the defendant remove the 
state law claim so that a federal court will rule on the validity of its federal 
preemption defense? The front door to the federal courthouse for our 
corporate defendant is the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
33
 Yet 
the general removal statute permits removal of a state case to federal court 
only if a district court could have exercised original jurisdiction over the 
case in the first place.
34
 So, absent diversity jurisdiction, the corporate 
defendant cannot establish the requisite federal question jurisdiction based 
solely on its conflict preemption defense, and thus cannot remove under 
§ 1441.
35
 The result is that a district court will grant the plaintiff‘s motion 
for remand and a state judge, rather than the defendant‘s preferred federal 
judge, will ultimately determine whether a conflict exists between federal 
and state law, and whether that conflict will foreclose the plaintiff‘s 
remedy for the defendant‘s violation of state law.36 
 
 
331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). ―That assumption applies with particular force when Congress has 
legislated in a field traditionally occupied by the States.‖ Id. 
 32. See O‘REILLY, supra note 26, at 72–73. 
 33. The general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000), states that ―any civil action brought 
in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be 
removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district 
and division embracing the place where such action is pending.‖ 
 34. Id.  
 35. See Beneficial Nat‘l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 19 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). ―Of 
critical importance here, the rejection of a federal defense as the basis for original federal-question 
jurisdiction applies with equal force when the defense is one of pre-emption. ‗By unimpeachable 
authority, a suit brought upon a state statute does not arise under an act of Congress or the Constitution 
of the United States because prohibited thereby.‘‖ Id. at 12–13 (citing Gully v. First Nat‘l Bank in 
Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 116 (1936)). ―‗A case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of . . . 
the defense of pre-emption. . . .‘ To be sure, pre-emption requires a state court to dismiss a particular 
claim that is filed under state law, but it does not, as a general matter, provide grounds for removal.‖ 
Id. at 13 (citations omitted). 
 36. One exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the doctrine of complete preemption. 
Elucidated recently in Beneficial Bank, the doctrine provides that a state-law claim is completely 
preempted, and can therefore be removed to federal court, if federal law provides the exclusive cause 
of action for plaintiffs who wish to seek relief for the harm alleged. Beneficial Bank, 539 U.S. at 8. 
Originally, the doctrine was established by the Supreme Court in the 1968 case of Avco Corp. v. Aero 
Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968). The Avco Court declared that Section 301 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA) completely preempted state law claims related to labor relations. 
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Two inescapable questions follow. Does it matter? And if so, to whom? 
The simple answer belies its complex underpinnings. Yes, it matters a lot. 
And it matters not only to the individual litigants, but also to state and 
federal governments. For the litigants, the difference between a state and 
federal forum has immediate significance. Empirical evidence supports the 
conventional wisdom that the state court system tends to be more 
hospitable to plaintiffs, while the federal system is much friendlier terrain 
for the corporate defendant.
37
 Even more poignant are the data showing 
that plaintiffs‘ win rates in cases removed to federal court are much lower 
than cases originally filed in federal court, even after a regression 
controlling for potential confounding variables.
38
 
The question of who rules on conflict preemption defenses also matters 
for state and federal governments. A common justification for the grant of 
federal question jurisdiction to the federal courts is that states cannot be 
trusted to adequately safeguard federal rights.
39
 Indeed, proponents of this 
 
 
Id. at 559–60. Subsequently, the doctrine of complete preemption has only been expanded to include 
two other statutory provisions. The first, section 502(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA) was held to completely preempt state law claims in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 
481 U.S. 58, 66–67 (1987). Finally, the Beneficial Bank Court held that state law claims of usury 
brought against national banks are completely preempted by the National Bank Act. See Beneficial 
Bank, 539 U.S. at 10–11. 
 37. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: 
Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947. Professors 
Clermont and Eisenberg set out to evaluate whether there was any statistically significant difference 
between how losing defendants fare in the federal appellate courts compared to losing plaintiffs. Id. at 
948–49. Running a regression analysis on data that included every federal trial and appellate decision 
between 1988 and 1997, Clermont and Eisenberg found that defendants that appeal their losses after 
trial obtain reversals at a 33% rate, while plaintiffs succeed at only a 12% rate. Id. at 952, tbl.1. The 
study attempted to control for variables that might affect the statistics. Id. at 950. The authors 
concluded that appellate judges‘ preference for ruling for defendants probably stems from the 
perception that juries and trial courts are friendly towards plaintiffs. Id. at 971. 
 38. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything 
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction. 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581 (1998). The 
authors‘ findings show that plaintiff‘s win rates in removed cases are much lower than in original 
federal cases. Id. at 593, 594 tbl.1. For example, the win rate in original diversity cases is 71%, while 
in removed diversity cases it is only 34%. Id. at 593. Here too the authors attempted to control for any 
confounding variables, but still found the decrease in plaintiffs win rates in removed cases to be 
statistically significant. Even in a regression controlling for many of these variables, the removal effect 
on plaintiff‘s win rates is significant. Id. at 597, 598 tbl.3. The authors conclude that not only does 
forum affect outcome, but also that the mere fact of removal further decreases a plaintiff‘s probability 
of success. Id. at 606–07. 
 39. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 316 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1966). 
Alexander Hamilton explained that ―[t]he most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a 
local spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes.‖ Id. 
Hamilton felt that ―[s]tate judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from year to year, will be 
too little independent to be relied upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws.‖ Id.; see also 
AM. LAW INST., STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
168 (1969) (arguing that federal question jurisdiction should exist ―to protect litigants relying on 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/4
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justification can point to a history of state court hostility to federal claims 
and resistance to federal assumption of the states‘ traditional police 
powers.
40
 Common sense also suggests that federal judges, as creatures of 
federal political power, might be more inclined to construe potential 
inconsistencies between state and federal law as obstacles to federal 
supremacy, and hence more inclined to deny litigants relief under state law 
on preemption grounds. By contrast, state judges, many of whom are 
elected and thus directly accountable to the fellow citizens of their states, 
may think twice before denying one of those citizens relief under state law 
on the seemingly ethereal grounds of implied conflict preemption.
41
 In 
light of this tension, the allocation of decision-making power over 
preemption defenses between state and federal judges may influence the 
balance of power between the state and federal systems.
42
 
Two other justifications for the grant of federal question jurisdiction to 
the federal courts—expertise and uniformity—reveal similar federalism 
problems. If one accepts that the more frequent exposure of federal judges 
to issues of federal law creates expertise that eludes their state court 
colleagues, one might expect that federal judges would make fewer 
mistakes in the application of federal law.
43
 Proper application of 
preemption principles, in turn, may better effectuate federal legislative 
intent and promote judicial efficiency that favors federal power. Similarly, 
the consistent allocation of issues raising state and federal conflicts to a 
unitary federal judicial system, rather than fifty separate state systems, 
may promote greater uniformity of outcome,
44
 but again presumably in 
 
 
federal law from the danger that the state courts will not properly apply that law, either through 
misunderstanding or lack of sympathy‖). 
 40. See, e.g., Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110–15 (1977). 
 41. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 36 (―For example, the federal judicial system has greater 
insulation from political pressure because federal judges have life tenure and salaries that cannot be 
decreased, whereas in thirty-eight states there is some form of judicial election.‖). 
 42. There, of course, remains the possibility that a state decision on federal preemption will 
eventually reach the Supreme Court through its appellate jurisdiction, but in light of the Court‘s 
shrinking docket and the concomitant increase in potential state-federal conflicts, it is unlikely that a 
federal court could review state court decisions on the vast majority of preemption defenses. 
 43. See Gil Seinfeld, The Puzzle of Complete Preemption, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 537 (2007). 
Professor Seinfeld posits that the federal courts‘ capacity to provide greater uniformity in the 
interpretation of federal law stems from the facts that there are a lot fewer federal than state judges, 
and that they have greater expertise with federal law because they hear arguments on it more often. Id. 
at 542 n.12. 
 44. But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 8, at 272. Professor Chemerinsky finds this rationale 
―problematic.‖ Id. ―It is not clear that ninety-four federal judicial districts will produce more 
uniformity than fifty state judiciaries.‖ Id. While ―[i]t might be argued that thirteen federal courts of 
appeals will produce more uniformity,‖ the fact that ―[o]n a controversial issue, there are likely to be 
[just] two or three different positions‖ makes the uniformity argument less persuasive. Id. 
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favor of federal law. Ultimately, the question of who will rule on the 
corporate defendant‘s conflict preemption defense has immediate 
significance to the litigants, and lasting structural implications for the 
balance of power between the state and federal systems.  
C. Critiques of, and Reasons for, the Divergence in Interpretation 
The Court‘s drastically different interpretations of nearly identical 
language in Article III and § 1331 greatly affect both individual litigants 
and the structural balance between state and federal governments. This 
raises an obvious question—why the divergence? What little legislative 
history exists for § 1331 suggests that Congress intended to confer the 
entirety of constitutional federal question jurisdiction to the federal 
courts.
45
 The difficulty in reconciling the divergence as a matter of 
statutory interpretation has led many commentators to conclude that the 
Court either got it wrong, or at least that it failed to articulate a principled 
basis for distinguishing the § 1331 language.
46
 After all, if the reason for 
granting federal jurisdiction to federal causes of action is the importance 
of vindicating federal rights, the federal interest is just as great when the 
federal right arises in a defense as when it arises in the complaint itself.
47
 
The potential for antifederal bias is equal whether a plaintiff asserts a 
federal right in state court or whether a defendant asserts a federal defense 
in state court.
48
 
Other commentators, while acknowledging the Court‘s failure to 
convincingly support its multifarious federal question decisions with logic, 
 
 
 45. See 2 CONG. REC. 4,986–87 (1874). Senator Carpenter, the author of the bill, stated that 
―[t]he Act of 1789 did not confer the whole power which the Constitution conferred. . . . This bill gives 
precisely the power which the Constitution confers—nothing more, nothing less.‖ Id.  
 46. See generally James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal 
Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1942); Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No Reason for It; It’s Just 
Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question 
Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987). The Supreme Court itself apparently agrees. In its recent 
Franchise Tax Board decision, the Court admitted that the rule is based more on ―history than logic,‖ 
but refused to change it. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 4 
(1983). The Court continues to defer to Congress to alter the well-pleaded complaint rule. See id. at 10 
n.9 (mentioning congressional proposals to amend the rule, but noting that such proposals have not 
been adopted). So Congress has consistently reenacted the original Act granting federal jurisdiction 
without altering the language with full knowledge of the fact that the Supreme Court utilizes the well-
pleaded complaint rule. 
 47. Doernberg, supra note 46, at 650–51 (explaining the desirability of having federal court 
decide dispositive federal questions regardless of whether plaintiffs or defendants raise those federal 
questions). Note, however, that the determination of whether a federal question is dispositive would 
often necessitate an inquiry into the merits in order to determine jurisdiction. 
 48. Seinfeld, supra note 43, at 545. 
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point instead to the practical implications of applying the Article III 
―arising under‖ interpretation to § 1331. Specifically, the explosion of 
potential federal questions that accompanied the massive accumulation of 
new federal legislation since the interpretation of the Article III language 
would turn most cases into federal question cases under Osborn.
49
 Hence, 
it was primarily the Court‘s concern with the control of the federal docket 
that drove the narrow interpretation of § 1331.
50
 Indeed, the creation of the 
well-pleaded complaint rule coincided with a flood of litigation 
implicating federal land grants, which if allowed to proceed in federal 
court under Osborn, would have overwhelmed the still-limited federal 
court system.
51
 Despite strong criticism of docket control as a tool of 
statutory construction in the realm of federal jurisdiction,
52
 the fact 
remains that the well-pleaded complaint rule, along with the § 1441 
prerequisite of original federal jurisdiction for removal, shuts the front 
door to the federal courthouse for the defendant asserting a preemption 
defense in a state case. 
III. HISTORY LEAVES A BACKDOOR CRACKED: THE FEDERAL OFFICER 
REMOVAL STATUTE 
A. Historical Versions of the Federal Officer Removal Statute 
Even when history closes the front door, it has a knack for leaving 
backdoors cracked open for the persistent and well-funded litigant. One 
such crack emerged in the history of the federal officer removal statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Congress enacted the original federal officer removal 
 
 
 49. See, e.g., Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. 
REV. 157, 162–63 (1953). ―To include within the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts all cases 
which might conceivably turn finally upon an issue of national law would create an impossible 
situation.‖ Id. at 163. 
 50. Seinfeld, supra note 43, at 546. 
 51. Id. Professor Seinfeld explains that around the same time that the Supreme Court decided the 
string of cases establishing the well-pleaded complaint rule, docket-control concerns were paramount 
because of the flood of litigation pertaining to western land grants. Id. Because the title to the western 
lands descended from a grant from the United States, this could have meant a caseload that was 
beyond the resources or capacity of the federal courts. Id.; see also Arthur R. Miller, Artful Pleading: 
A Doctrine in Search of Definition, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (1998). 
 52. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State 
and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and the “Martian Chronicles”, 78 VA. L. REV. 1769 (1992). 
―[T]he criteria for making . . . a reduction [in the federal docket] must be selected on the basis of a 
rational assessment of how particular groupings of cases would be served by the assertion of federal 
jurisdiction, not by the use of an approach that focuses on a convenient, but totally irrelevant, 
distinguishing factor.‖ Id. at 1795. 
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statute
53
 at the end of the War of 1812 in order to permit removal of state 
claims against federal customs officials.
54
 The main purpose of this early 
statute was to prevent interference by hostile state courts with the 
implementation of federal objectives by providing a federal forum more 
inclined to displace conflicting state law and to acknowledge valid federal 
defenses.
55
 
Congress reincarnated the federal officer removal statute in the early 
1830s in response to a South Carolina law that made the federal tax laws 
unconstitutional, and authorized the state prosecution of federal tax 
collectors.
56
 Once again, the statute provided for removal of state claims to 
a federal forum that recognized the authority and supremacy of federal 
law.
57
 The next iteration enlarged the pool of persons entitled to remove by 
including the phrase ―any person acting under or by authority of any 
[revenue] officer‖ in the statute.58  
 
 
 53. Act of Feb. 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 1442 (a)(1) (2000)). 
The act reads:  
[I]f any suit or prosecution be commenced in any state court, against any collector, naval 
officer, surveyor, inspector, or any other officer, civil or military, or any other person aiding 
or assisting, agreeable to the provisions of this act, or under colour thereof, for any thing 
done, or omitted to be done, as an officer of the customs, or for any thing done by virtue of 
this act or under colour thereof, . . . the defendant shall, at the time of entering his appearance 
in such court, file a petition for the removal of the cause for trial at the next circuit court of 
the United States to be holden . . . where the suit is pending . . . [and] the cause shall there 
proceed in the same manner as if it had been brought there by original process . . . .  
Id. 
 54. At that time, United States customs officials were trying to enforce a trade embargo against 
England. Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405 (1969). In response to having their goods seized 
by federal agents, American ship owners brought state-court claims against federal customs officials. 
Id. 
 55. Id. see also Note, Limitations on State Judicial Interference with Federal Activities, 51 
COLUM. L. REV. 84, 97 (1951) (explaining that the primary goal of the removal statutes is to attain 
decisions by federal tribunals so as to enforce national policy and achieve uniformity of result). 
 56. Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, § 3, 4 Stat. 632 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) 
(2000)). The act reads:  
[I]n any case where suit or prosecution shall be commenced in a court of any state, against 
any officer of the United States, or other person, for or on account of any act done under the 
revenue laws of the United States, or under colour thereof, or for or on account of any right, 
authority, or title, set up or claimed by such officer, . . . it shall be lawful for the defendant in 
such suit or prosecution, at any time before trial, upon a petition to the circuit court of the 
United States, in and for the district in which the defendant shall have been served with 
process, . . . the cause shall thereupon be entered on docket of said court, and shall be 
thereafter proceeded in as a cause originally commenced in that court . . . .  
Id. at 633. 
 57. See 9 CONG. DEB. 461 (1833) (statement of Sen. Webster). Senator Daniel Webster 
explained at the time of the act‘s enactment that to avoid state courts that might be hostile to federal 
law, the statute would ―give a chance to the officer to defend himself where the authority of the law 
was recognised.‖ Id.  
 58. Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 67, 14 Stat. 171, 171 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
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In 1948, Congress revised the federal officer removal statute and 
abandoned the limitation of the statute‘s application to the context of 
revenue collection.
59
 The final modification that led to the version of the 
statute in existence today occurred in 1996, when Congress explicitly 
included agencies of the United States as parties protected by the statute.
60
  
B. Who Can Remove Under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)? 
The federal officer removal statute makes clear that any officer or 
agency can remove state claims to federal court when the allegedly illegal 
actions were taken under color of federal law. But the statute also allows 
persons ―acting under‖ those officers and agencies to remove.61 The statute 
itself offers no clues on what ―acting under‖ an officer or agency means, 
so § 1442(a)(1) raises the obvious question of when a private person can 
remove.
62
 
Several early Supreme Court cases demonstrate the development of 
judicial interpretation of the ―acting under‖ clause of the predecessors to 
 
 
§ 1442(a)(1) (2000)). 
 59. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1442(a), 62 Stat. 938, 938; 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (2000). 
 60. See Int‘l Primate Prot. League v. Adm‘rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72 (1991). In this 
case, a group of animal advocates sued in Louisiana state court to enjoin the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH) from euthanizing monkeys on which the NIH had been conducting research. Id. at 74–
76. The NIH removed the case to federal court based on § 1442(a)(1), but the district court granted the 
injunction. Id. at 75–76. After the Fifth Circuit reversed and vacated the injunction, the animal 
protection group challenged the federal courts‘ jurisdiction of the subject matter. Id. at 76. The 
Supreme Court engaged in an exercise of statutory construction, and concluded that because the statute 
used language permitting removal of action against ―officer[s] of the United States or any agency 
thereof,‖ agencies themselves were not officers entitled to removal. Id. at 82–84. The Court reasoned 
that unlike the more complicated federal officer immunity defense, which Congress thought better be 
decided by federal courts, federal agency immunity defenses were reasonably suited for resolution in 
state court. Id. at 85–86. In response, Congress amended the federal officer removal statute to 
specifically include agencies of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1); Act of Oct. 19, 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-317, tit. II, § 206(a), 110 Stat. 3847, 3850. 
 61. Courts agree that a corporation is a person within the meaning of § 1442(a). See Ryan v. Dow 
Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 934, 947 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). But see Krangel v. Crown, 791 F. Supp. 1436 
(S.D. Cal. 1992) (remanding because defendant corporation was not a person under § 1442(a)(1)). The 
Krangel decision was an anomaly and it is now universally accepted that corporations can be 
―persons‖ within the meaning of § 1442(a)(1). See Isaacson v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 F.3d 129, 136 (2d 
Cir. 2008).  
 62. The full language of the statute reads:  
A civil action or criminal prosecution commenced in a State court against any of the 
following may be removed by them to the district court of the United States for the district 
and division embracing the place wherein it is pending: (1) The United States or any agency 
thereof or any officer (or any person acting under that officer) of the United States or of any 
agency thereof, sued in an official or individual capacity for any act under color of such office 
. . . .  
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added). 
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§ 1442(a)(1). In Davis v. South Carolina,
63
 for example, an army officer 
helped a federal revenue officer arrest a distiller for violating federal 
revenue laws.
64
 During the arrest, the army officer shot and killed the 
distiller and was indicted for murder.
65
 The Supreme Court upheld 
removal because the officer ―acted under‖ the direction of the revenue 
officer when he joined in the attempted arrest, thereby bringing himself 
within the confines of the statute.
66
 In Maryland v. Soper,
67
 prohibition 
agents and the private citizen who drove them were charged with murder 
when a person was shot and killed during a distillery raid. Even though the 
Court eventually rejected removal,
68
 it made the important pronouncement 
that even somebody acting as a chauffeur under the orders of federal 
agents enjoyed the same protection of the removal statute as did the agents 
themselves.
69
  
After the 1948 enactment of § 1442(a)(1) removed the statute‘s 
limitation to the revenue context, federal courts began to see an increase in 
attempts by other nongovernmental entities to use the ―acting under‖ 
clause of the statute to remove state cases against them to federal court. In 
Gurda Farms, Inc. v. Monroe County Legal Assistance Corp.,
70
 for 
example, employers of migrant farm workers sued a legal assistance 
corporation and its lawyers for ―conspiracy to induce the workers to 
breach their employment [contracts].‖71 The legal assistance corporation 
had received grants from the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) so 
that it would serve the needs of the migrant workers.
72
 As a condition of 
the grants, the corporation had to comply with various OEO regulations, 
including submitting reports and permitting government audits.
73
 A district 
court concluded that the OEO‘s conditions constituted sufficient federal 
control of the attorneys and the legal assistance corporation so that the 
 
 
 63. 107 U.S. 597 (1883). 
 64. Id. at 597–98. The federal officer removal statute in this case was limited to removal by 
revenue officers and persons acting under them.  
 65. Id. at 598. 
 66. Id. at 600. 
 67. 270 U.S. 9 (1926). 
 68. In Soper, the Court held that the officers seeking removal did not allege in sufficient detail 
that the actions giving rise to their state murder prosecution were undertaken strictly in an official 
capacity while enforcing the revenue laws of the United States. Id. at 35. As a result, the Supreme 
Court issued a writ of mandamus forcing the district court to remand the case to Maryland state court. 
Id. at 35–36. 
 69. Id. at 30. 
 70. 358 F. Supp. 841 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
 71. Id. at 842. 
 72. Id. at 845.  
 73. Id. 
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attorneys were ―acting under‖ a federal agency when they interacted with 
the migrant workers.
74
 The case stayed in federal court. 
In Winters v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co.,
75
 the Fifth Circuit 
evaluated a state claim by a nurse who had been exposed to Agent Orange 
manufactured by the defendant in Vietnam.
76
 The defendant claimed that it 
was ―acting under‖ the direction of the United States military when it 
manufactured the Agent Orange because the government specified the 
precise formula, as well as the packaging, labeling, and shipping 
requirements.
77
 In addition, the government compelled the defendant to 
deliver the Agent Orange under threat of criminal sanction.
78
 The Fifth 
Circuit found that such detailed specification, supervision, and control was 
sufficient to find that defendant was ―acting under‖ a federal officer when 
it manufactured the product.
79
 
A California district court reached a similar conclusion in Fung v. Abex 
Corp.
80
 In Fung, workers exposed to asbestos during the construction of 
submarines sued the manufacturer.
81
 The submarines were built pursuant 
to a federal contract where the government monitored the defendant‘s 
performance and required that it keep strict contract specifications.
82
 In 
addition, the government had a contractual right to inspect and approve all 
supplies to ensure compliance with the contract.
83
 The Fung court found 
 
 
 74. Id. at 847. Note that after the Supreme Court‘s Watson decision, the outcome of this case 
would depend not on the level of control exercised by the OEO over the legal assistance corporation, 
but on whether the services that the corporation was providing were traditional governmental services 
such that the corporation was assisting the federal government in carrying out its official duties. See 
infra Part V.A. 
 75. 149 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 76. Id. at 390. 
 77. Id. at 399. 
 78. Id. at 398. 
 79. Id. at 399–400. After the Supreme Court‘s decision in Watson, the level and detail of 
supervision and control is no longer a relevant factor in analyzing whether a federal contractor 
warrants the protection of § 1442(a)(1). See infra Part V. What is relevant is the type of activity that 
the contractor was performing for the federal government. If the activity is one that is traditionally a 
governmental activity, then the contractor deserves removal. See Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 
127 S. Ct. 2301, 2308 (2007). Conducting a war or providing for the national defense qualifies as such 
an activity. Id. 
 80. 816 F. Supp. 569, 572 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
 81. Id. at 570–71. 
 82. Id. at 572–73. 
 83. Id. at 573. The Fung court also noted that the ―control requirement can be satisfied by strong 
government intervention and the threat that a defendant will be sued in state court ‗based upon actions 
taken pursuant to federal direction.‘‖ Id. at 572 (quoting Gulati v. Zuckerman, 723 F. Supp. 353, 358 
(E.D. Pa. 1989)). Note again that after Watson, the control requirement is no longer relevant.  
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this level of direction and control sufficient to satisfy the ―acting under‖ 
clause of § 1442(a)(1), and the case stayed in federal court.
84
 
Noticing the trend that federal courts‘ analysis of § 1442(a)(1) largely 
turned on the level and detail of government control rather than the 
existence of a contractual relationship, defendants in highly regulated 
industries noticed that the backdoor to the federal courthouse was cracked 
open and began to remove under § 1442(a)(1). In Tremblay v. Philip 
Morris,
 
Inc.,
85
 Philip Morris removed a light cigarette class action from 
state court in New Hampshire.
86
 Philip Morris argued that removal was 
proper because it was ―merely attempting to comply with the FTC‘s 
policies regarding the testing and labeling of light cigarettes when it 
engaged in the conduct for which it [was] sued.‖87 The Tremblay court was 
unconvinced by Philip Morris‘s argument and noted that mere compliance 
with regulation did not transform it into a federal actor.
88
 Undeterred, 
Philip Morris and other tobacco companies began to remove cases to 
federal court under § 1442(a)(1) as a matter of course, though they did not 
have much success keeping them there.
89
 
Defendants in other highly regulated industries soon tried to sneak 
through the same backdoor. In Jamison v. Purdue Pharma Co.,
90
 the 
manufacturer of the drug OxyContin removed state claims of failure to 
warn from a Mississippi court.
91
 The manufacturer based its § 1442(a)(1) 
 
 
 84. Id. at 573. Another case involving a military contractor, however, reached a different result. 
See Ryan v. Dow Chem. Co., 781 F. Supp. 934 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). In Ryan, the manufacturer had 
removed a case filed in Texas state court that sought damages for injuries suffered from exposure to 
Agent Orange in Vietnam. Id. at 937. While the manufacturer in Ryan was under similar direction and 
supervision from the government as was the Winters defendant, the Ryan court ultimately decided to 
remand the case. Id. at 953. The court distinguished the design and formulation of the Agent Orange 
from its delivery to the military. Id. at 950. Because the government did not control the herbicide‘s 
development, the defendant did not ―act under‖ a federal officer when it created the dangerous 
chemical. Id. 
 85. 231 F. Supp. 2d 411 (D.N.H. 2002).  
 86. Id. at 413–14. The plaintiffs‘ theory in Tremblay was identical to the one put forward by the 
Watson class, and the argument for federal officer removal made by Philip Morris was also identical. 
Id. at 413–14. There have been a large number of light cigarette fraud cases around the country, and 
Philip Morris has attempted to remove using the federal officer statute in all of them. See generally 
EDWARD L. SWEDA, JR., MARK GOTTLIEB & CHRISTOPHER N. BANTHIN, LIGHT CIGARETTE LAWSUITS 
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007 (2007). The Watson decision was the first successful removal. Id. at 9. 
 87. Tremblay, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 417. 
 88. Id. at 419. 
 89. See generally Pearson v. Philip Morris, No. 03-CV-178-HA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24508 
(D. Or. Aug. 8, 2003); Virden v. Altria Group, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 2d 832 (N.D. W.Va. 2004); Paldrmic 
v. Altria Corporate Servs., 327 F. Supp 2d 959 (E.D. Wis. 2004). Altria is the parent company of 
Philip Morris. 
 90. 251 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (S.D. Miss. 2003). 
 91. Id. at 1318. 
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argument on the fact that the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
regulates in detail the approval, labeling, and marketing of prescription 
drugs.
92
 Hence, the acts giving rise to plaintiffs‘ suits were taken ―under‖ 
the FDA, a federal agent. The district court remanded, explaining that 
―[defendants] are not government contractors, delivering either a product 
or service to the United States, or to beneficiaries designated by the 
government.‖93 Furthermore, the FDA did not explicitly direct the 
defendant to avoid warning consumers; it merely found the warnings the 
FDA approved sufficient for purposes of federal law.
94
 While the court 
acknowledged that the defendant was highly regulated by the FDA, it 
found that being subject to such regulation was insufficient to support 
federal officer removal.
95
 
Next to follow was the telecommunications industry. In In re Wireless 
Telephone Radio Frequency Emissions Products Liability Litigation,
96
 
cellular telephone manufacturers removed state claims alleging that radio 
 
 
 92. Id. at 1325; see also In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 428 F. 
Supp. 2d 1014 (D. Minn. 2006). The Guidant plaintiffs were survivors and estates of patients who had 
died as a result of malfunction of automatic implantable cardioverter defibrillators manufactured by 
the defendant. Id. at 1016. Their theories for relief included product liability, negligence, and 
fraudulent concealment. Id. The manufacturer removed cases based on the federal officer removal 
statute, arguing that in designing, manufacturing, and marketing the defibrillators at issue, it acted 
under the direct control and supervision of the FDA. Id. The court concluded that the defendant failed 
to show that it acted under the direction of the FDA, as necessary for removal, and that there was no 
causal connection between the alleged defects and deception, and the FDA‘s regulatory authority. Id. 
at 1017–18. This decision was issued after the Watson Eighth Circuit decision, yet the court 
distinguished Watson on the basis that the participation and level of control by the FDA over 
defendant was significantly less than that of the FTC over the tobacco industry. Id.  
 93. Jamison, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1326. When the Jamison court mentioned the fact that defendant 
was not delivering a service to beneficiaries designated by the government, it was referring to a line of 
cases that applied § 1442(a)(1) to private companies acting as intermediaries in the Medicare program, 
which were acting under the direction of the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See, e.g., 
Peterson v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Tex., 508 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1975); Neurological Assocs. v. Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1986); Holton v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield of S.C., 56 F. Supp. 2d 1347 (M.D. Ala. 1999). 
 94. Jamison, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1326–27. This reasoning by the Jamison court suggests that if 
the FDA had in fact explicitly directed defendant to avoid warning, that would have brought defendant 
within the confines of § 1442(a)(1). Note that this is in essence a statement that in a case of conflict 
preemption based on an explicit federal directive, the federal officer removal statute becomes a vehicle 
for removal. This is exactly the logic behind the decisions of the lower courts in Watson. See infra Part 
VI. Taking the Jamison court at its word, it appears that given the right facts, that court also was 
willing to make the same decision as the lower courts in Watson. The Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Watson, of course, completely foreclosed the possibility of § 1442(a)(1) being used as a method of 
removal even in the case of a conflict preemption defense based on an explicit federal directive. See 
infra Part V. It is still interesting to note that even courts that were denying highly regulated 
companies the use of § 1442(a)(1) continued to leave openings for such an invocation given the right 
circumstances—namely an explicit federal directive.  
 95. Jamison, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 1326. 
 96. 216 F. Supp. 2d 474 (D. Md. 2002). 
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frequencies increased the chance of the plaintiffs contracting brain 
cancer.
97
 The manufacturers argued that they deserved § 1442(a)(1) 
removal because the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
specifically directed defendants to manufacture, test, and sell phones that 
emit only approved radio frequency radiation.
98
 A Maryland district court 
was also unconvinced by this argument, finding that defendants were 
simply regulated by the FCC, and that the FCC did not specifically instruct 
them to avoid warning consumers or adding safety devices to their 
products.
99
 In that sense, they were not ―acting under‖ the FCC when they 
allegedly violated the plaintiffs‘ state law rights.100 
In In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Product Liability 
Litigation,
101
 the defendants were more successful, albeit for only a short 
while. In this case, plaintiffs sued gasoline refiners, distributors, and 
retailers, claiming that the gasoline additive MTBE leaked from storage 
tanks and contaminated their groundwater supplies.
102
 Defendants 
removed to federal court on the theory that Congress, when it enacted the 
Clean Air Act, authorized the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to 
approve various additives to gasoline that oxygenated it and reduced air 
pollution.
103
 MTBE was one of the EPA‘s approved additives.104 
Additionally, the defendants argued that the EPA knew that MTBE would 
be used and also could foresee that some MTBE would leak from storage 
tanks and contaminate groundwater.
105
 After reviewing federal contractor 
cases requiring a high degree of federal control over defendants, a district 
court agreed that the EPA had approved the use of MTBE, and found that 
 
 
 97. Id. at 479. 
 98. Id. at 499–500. 
 99. Id. at 500. Again, this court, like the Jamison court, suggests that if the FCC had directed the 
defendants in this case to take the specific actions complained of, then federal officer removal would 
have been available. See id. This amounts to a statement that where a conflict preemption defense is 
based on an explicit federal directive, the actor‘s conduct becomes conduct ―under‖ a federal officer 
and becomes qualified for removal under § 1442(a)(1). This suggestion by the court is particularly 
interesting in light of its statement earlier in the opinion that ―[u]nder ordinary conflict preemption, 
state laws that conflict with federal laws are preempted, and preemption is asserted as ‗a federal 
defense to the plaintiff‘s suit. As a defense it does not appear on the face of a well-pleaded-complaint, 
and, therefore, does not authorize removal to federal court.‘‖ In re Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 493 
(quoting Darcangelo v. Verizon Commc‘ns, 292 F.3d 181, 186–87 (4th Cir. 2002)) (discussing it as 
part of its complete preemption analysis but failing to raise issue in its § 1442(a)(1) analysis). 
 100. In re Wireless, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 500. 
 101. 342 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) [hereinafter In re MTBE]. 
 102. Id. at 149–50. 
 103. Id. at 150–51. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 151. 
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defendants had ―acted under‖ a federal agency and could remove their 
cases to federal court.
106
 
On interlocutory appeal of the district court‘s order, the Second Circuit 
reversed.
107
 The Second Circuit pointed to the fact that the district judge‘s 
conclusion was ―not based on any explicit directive in either the Clean Air 
Act or its implementing regulations.‖108 Even accepting the defendants‘ 
allegations that Congress and the EPA approved of and knew that MTBE 
would be used as a gasoline additive, there was no evidence that any 
government agency directed the defendants to use MTBE.
109
 The EPA 
only created regulations for the control of pollution and gave the 
defendants options on how to reach those regulatory goals.
110
 Fearing that 
an alternative decision would federalize many state tort claims, the Second 
Circuit held that the MTBE cases were improperly removed to federal 
court under § 1442(a)(1).
111
 
 
 
 106. Id. at 154–59. It is important to understand that this decision essentially accomplished the 
same result and created the same rule as did the lower courts in Watson. Namely, this court concluded 
that since the EPA approved the use of MTBE, and because plaintiffs alleged that the use of MTBE 
violated state law, compliance with both the federal regulation and state law being impossible was a 
colorable defense. See In re MTBE, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 158. This is the quintessential basis for the 
conflict preemption doctrine. See supra note 30. Note that this court, unlike the courts in Jamison and 
In re Wireless, did not even require an explicit directive in order to turn a conflict preemption defense 
that would normally be used at the summary judgment stage, into an argument for federal officer 
removal at the jurisdictional stage.  
 107. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (―MTBE‖) Prods. Liab. Litig., 488 F.3d 112, 136 (2d Cir. 
2007). 
 108. Id. at 126.  
 109. Id. at 126–27. Even though the Second Circuit reversed the district court‘s decision, it read 
§ 1442(a)(1) to permit removal where there is an explicit federal directive. Id. In so doing, it adopted a 
reading similar to that in the Jamison and In re Wireless courts. In essence, the only difference 
between the district court‘s interpretation of the statute and that of the Second Circuit, is that the 
Second Circuit would create the additional requirement that a conflict preemption defense needs to be 
based on an explicit federal directive rather than the mere conflict of the laws or regulations. While 
this interpretation is narrower than that of the lower courts in Watson, it still creates an exception to the 
well-pleaded complaint rule based on conflict preemption.  
 110. Id. at 127–30. A portion of the case explored the Eighth Circuit Watson decision in some 
detail. Id. at 130–31. First, the Second Circuit questioned whether the case was decided correctly. Id. 
Then the court concluded that even if the Watson court was correct, the regulation by the FTC over 
tobacco companies was much more direct than the regulation by the EPA there. Id. at 131. Finally, the 
court pointed to the Watson concurrence which made a special point to emphasize that the Watson 
decision should not be construed to give a federally regulated entity a ticket into federal court. Id. at 
131. 
 111. Id. at 132. This last statement, although cursory, appears to be concerned with the impact on 
the federal docket should the court reach an alternative decision. In that sense, it is similar to what this 
Note suggests is the real rationale behind the Supreme Court‘s decision in Watson.  
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IV. SNEAKING THROUGH THE BACKDOOR BUT LEAVING IT WIDE OPEN: 
THE WATSON LOWER COURT DECISIONS 
A. Grounds for the Lower Courts’ Decisions 
In April 2003 a class of light cigarette smokers sued Philip Morris in 
Arkansas state court for violating the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices 
Act
112
 by deceptively marketing light cigarettes as lower in tar and 
nicotine than regular cigarettes.
113
 After Philip Morris removed the case to 
the Eastern District of Arkansas, plaintiffs moved to remand.
114
 Philip 
Morris argued that the federal court had jurisdiction under § 1442(a)(1) 
because Philip Morris ―acted under‖ the FTC when it tested its cigarettes 
and later based its advertising on those test results.
115
 Specifically, Philip 
Morris alleged that the FTC required tobacco companies to test cigarettes 
using the FTC-mandated test and to disclose those test results in all 
advertising for cigarettes in the United States.
116
 In addition, the FTC 
allegedly permitted tobacco companies to label cigarettes ―light‖ if they 
fell within specified ranges on their test results.
117
 
 
 
 112.  
(a) Deceptive and unconscionable trade practices made unlawful and prohibited by this 
chapter include, but are not limited to the following: 
(1) Knowingly making a false representation as to the characteristics, ingredients, uses, 
benefits, alterations, source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services, or as 
to whether goods are original or new, or of a particular standard, quality, grade, style, or 
model . . . . 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-107 (2001). 
 113. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 403-CV-519 GTE, 2003 WL 23272484, at *1 (E.D. Ark. 
Dec. 12, 2003). The essence of the complaint was that Philip Morris intentionally manipulated the 
design of its light cigarettes in order to receive lower tar and nicotine readings on the government 
mandated cigarette testing machine, and then knowingly used those misleading results to market their 
cigarettes as being healthier or less dangerous than normal cigarettes. Id. at *1–2. In reality, plaintiffs 
claimed, light cigarettes delivered as much tar and nicotine as regular cigarettes, but were in fact more 
dangerous than regular cigarettes when smoked by persons switching from regular to light. Id. 
 114. Id. at *2. 
 115. Id. One commentator referred to Philip Morris‘s theory for removal as ―almost laughable.‖ 
Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal Intersections 
Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 1252 (2008). ―Perhaps, 
had the argument not been made by such serious-looking men and in such an august setting, the 
argument would have been given the unceremonious boot back to state court right away.‖ Id. As 
discussed below in Part V, I do not find the argument to be as laughable as Mr. Hoffman. 
 116. Id. at *4.  
 117. Id. at *6. There has been a dispute between the FTC and the tobacco companies as to whether 
the FTC ever actually defined these terms. See 62 Fed. Reg. 48,158, 48,163 (Sept. 12, 1997). Again, 
no formal rules were adopted with respect to the use of these terms. Watson, 2003 WL 23272484, at 
*6. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol86/iss6/4
  
 
 
 
 
2009] PREEMPTION AND REMOVAL 1475 
 
 
 
 
After reviewing the arguments of both sides, the district court boiled 
the § 1442(a)(1) question down to a single issue: ―whether the actions that 
form the basis of the state suit were performed pursuant to comprehensive 
and detailed federal government regulation.‖118 The court‘s task, therefore, 
was to ―decide whether the FTC‘s regulation of cigarette testing and 
advertising constitutes the direct and detailed control required to invoke 
§ 1442(a)(1) jurisdiction and whether the manner in which Philip Morris 
tested and advertised Marlboro Lights and Cambridge Lights was directed 
by the FTC.‖119 
The district court surveyed the government contractor cases that 
evaluated the level of government control sufficient to invoke federal 
officer jurisdiction. It concluded that in order for a corporation to fall 
within the ―acting under‖ language of the federal officer removal statute, it 
had to be subject to more direct control by a federal agency than is the 
case in a typical regulatory scenario.
120
 Emphasizing the level and detail of 
control that the FTC exercised over Philip Morris with regard to its testing 
and advertising of cigarettes, the district court found that Philip Morris 
was indeed a person ―acting under‖ the FTC for purposes of § 1442(a)(1) 
and denied plaintiffs‘ motion to remand.121 The court then certified its 
decision for immediate interlocutory appeal.
122
 
 
 
 118. Watson, 2003 WL 23272484, at *10. This language frames the question of federal officer 
jurisdiction in terms most often used in arguments for complete preemption. By framing the question 
as it does, the district court almost necessarily brings into the picture the implications of its decision in 
terms of removal based on a conflict preemption defense.  
 119. Id. at *10.  
 120. Id. at *13. The court approved of another court‘s description of such a situation as 
―regulation plus.‖ See Bakalis v. Crossland Sav. Bank, 781 F. Supp. 140, 144–45 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). 
The Bakalis court was faced with a decision of whether to remand a case removed by a federally 
chartered savings bank from state court. Id. at 141. The bank was subject to extensive regulation by the 
Office of the Thrift Supervisor, a federal agency. Id. at 144. Despite the extensive regulation, the court 
concluded that mere regulation was not sufficient to turn the bank into a person ―acting under‖ a 
federal officer, and that something akin to ―regulation plus‖ was the standard for permitting removal. 
Id. at 144–45. Despite what it acknowledged was a ―somewhat amorphous standard‖ because of the 
number and complexity of federal institutions and programs, the Watson court was resigned to the fact 
that a precise formulation of the ―acting under‖ standard for regulated companies was impossible. 
Watson, 2003 WL 23272484, at *13. 
 121. Watson, 2003 WL 23272484, at *14. The court recognized that Philip Morris was not 
required to advertise its cigarettes as light or low tar. Id. at *15. But because the FTC required the 
testing, and permitted the use of the descriptors light and low tar if the test results were within 
specified parameters, plaintiffs‘ claim that such advertising was deceptive ―squarely confront[ed]‖ the 
FTC‘s regulation. Id. When presented with the fact that two other district courts had considered the 
exact same question with the same defendant and held that Philip Morris could not remove light class 
actions under § 1442(a)(1), the district court was content to find itself in disagreement with those 
courts. Id. at *20. 
 122. Id. at *23. 
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Reviewing the district court‘s decision de novo,123 the Eighth Circuit 
reiterated that whether Philip Morris ―acted under‖ the FTC within the 
meaning of § 1442(a)(1) depended ―on the role the FTC play[ed] in 
regulating the tobacco industry.‖124 The court focused on the detail and 
specificity of the direction of Philip Morris‘s advertising activities and 
whether the FTC exercised control over Philip Morris.
125
 After looking at 
the level of detail found sufficient in government contractor cases, the 
Eighth Circuit concluded that the FTC exercised a similar level of detailed 
and comprehensive regulation.
126
 Given this high level of control and the 
Supreme Court‘s instructions to interpret this statute broadly, the Eighth 
Circuit found that Philip Morris was in fact ―acting under‖ the FTC when 
it advertised its cigarettes, and affirmed the district court‘s ruling without 
dissent.
127
 
B. Philip Morris’s § 1442(a)(1) Argument Was a Thinly Disguised 
Conflict Preemption Argument 
Both the district court and the Eighth Circuit opinions reveal only a 
cursory mention of an essential prerequisite to federal officer removal—
the existence of a colorable federal defense.
128
 All that a reader can glean 
 
 
 123. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 420 F.3d 852, 855 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 124. Id. at 854–55. 
 125. Id. at 856–57. 
 126. Id. at 857–60. 
 127. Id. at 860–61. Note that a concurring judge on the Eighth Circuit wrote separately to 
emphasize that the decision ―should not be construed as an invitation to every participant in a heavily 
regulated industry to claim that it, like Philip Morris, acts at the direction of a federal officer merely 
because it tests or markets its products in accord with federal regulations.‖ Id. at 863 (Gruender, J., 
concurring). This, presumably, is an attempt by the court to limit its holding to what it considered the 
unique relationship of regulation between the FTC and the tobacco companies. However, the court 
never analyzed the level and detail of control that companies in other industries, such as 
pharmaceuticals, experience from their regulators, like the FDA. Suffice it to say that the court did not 
fully consider or appreciate the consequences and implications that its decision might have in other 
federally regulated industries, notwithstanding the concurrence‘s words of caution. 
 128. In general, in order for a federal defense to be considered colorable, it only needs to be 
plausible. United States v. Todd, 245 F.3d 691, 693 (8th Cir. 2001). A court does not need to find that 
a federal defense will be ―successful before removal is appropriate.‖ Id.; see also Pennsylvania v. 
Newcomer, 618 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1980). In Newcomer, the Third Circuit applied a broad reading of 
§ 1442(a)(1) by holding that federal officials did not need to assert a colorable federal defense such as 
immunity in order to be entitled to remove state criminal prosecutions against them. Id. at 250. The 
Third Circuit apparently based its decision on a reading of the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969), which upheld removal of an action against federal prison 
guards. The Newcomer court read the Willingham decision to permit the removal of civil cases when 
the acts complained of were performed while the federal officer was on duty. Newcomer, 618 F.2d at 
249–50. But, as the Court pointed out in Mesa v. California, such a reading of the federal officer 
removal statute presents serious constitutional problems. 489 U.S. 121, 136–37 (1989). Because 
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from the faces of the opinions is that Philip Morris claimed that federal 
law and regulation preempted plaintiffs‘ state law claims.129 The 
development of Philip Morris‘s preemption defense in an identical case 
recently decided by the Supreme Court,
130
 however, reveals the full extent 
of that defense. Specifically, Philip Morris argued both that the Federal 
Cigarette Labeling Act expressly preempted state law claims based on 
health messages in advertising, and that FTC regulation impliedly 
preempted state deceptive advertising claims because they stood as an 
obstacle to the FTC‘s effective regulation of the tobacco industry.131 
Close examination reveals that Philip Morris‘s implied conflict 
preemption argument and its § 1442(a)(1) argument are practically 
identical. Philip Morris alleged that the FTC mandated that all cigarette 
companies test their cigarettes according the specified FTC method, and 
that they place the testing results on all advertising for cigarettes.
132
 In 
addition, Philip Morris alleged that the FTC authorized the use of the term 
―light‖ for cigarettes falling within certain ranges on the FTC test.133 Then 
Philip Morris argued that when it sold the light cigarettes to the 
plaintiffs—the act that plaintiffs claimed violated Arkansas law—it was 
merely ―acting under‖ the FTC for purposes of § 1442(a)(1) and so 
deserved removal.
134
 
The only difference in Philip Morris‘s preemption argument is that 
instead of using those facts to support removal, it argued that the same 
facts supported summary judgment on conflict preemption grounds. More 
 
 
§ 1442(a)(1) is a pure jurisdictional statute, that simply gives the federal courts jurisdiction over 
federal officers; it does not independently satisfy the Article III ―arising under‖ federal law 
requirement. Id. To remedy this problem, the Court insisted that the assertion of a colorable federal 
defense was necessary to create the question of federal law that would satisfy the constitutional level 
of jurisdiction. Id. at 129. 
 129. See Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., No. 4:03-CV-519 GTE, 2003 WL 23272484, at *10 (E.D. 
Ark. Dec. 12, 2003); Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 420 F.3d 852, 862–63 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 Preemption, just like the federal officer removal statute, is concerned with the supremacy of 
federal law. See N.H. Motor Transp. Ass‘n v. Rowe, 448 F.3d 66, 74 (1st Cir. 2006) (―A fundamental 
tenet of our federalist system is that constitutionally enacted federal law is supreme to state law. As a 
result, federal law sometimes preempts state law either expressly or by implication.‖) (citation 
omitted). 
 130. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, No. 07-562, slip op. (Dec. 15, 2008). 
 131. See id. The Court eventually rejected Philip Morris‘s express preemption defense. Id. at 16. 
Philip Morris‘s implied preemption argument asked the Court to find that allowing plaintiffs to 
proceed with their state law fraud claim would present an obstacle to the FTC‘s effective regulation of 
the tobacco industry‘s advertising activities. Id. The Court ultimately rejected this implied preemption 
argument as well. Id. at 19–20. 
 132. Watson, 2003 WL 23272484, at *4. 
 133. Id. at *6. 
 134. Id. at *2. 
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precisely, if doing what the FTC told Philip Morris to do violated 
Arkansas law, and complying with Arkansas law would be inconsistent 
with the FTC‘s authorization, then simultaneous compliance with both 
authorities would be impossible. This inconsistency between Philip 
Morris‘s duties under the FTC‘s regulation and under state law, combined 
with the supremacy of federal regulation over state law, required a finding 
of implied preemption and a judgment for Philip Morris. 
C. Implication: A Conflict Preemption Defense Based on Detailed Federal 
Regulation Is Sufficient for § 1442(a)(1) Removal 
The district court‘s and the Eighth Circuit‘s failure to recognize that 
Philip Morris‘s removal and preemption arguments were one and the same 
turned the open crack in the backdoor to the federal courthouse into a 
gaping hole. Specifically, both courts held that when a defendant has a 
conflict preemption defense based on compliance with federal directives, 
the defendant can use that defense as a vehicle for removal to federal court 
under § 1442(a)(1). The crucial omission by both courts, of course, is that 
almost any federally regulated, national corporation can assert a colorable 
conflict preemption defense based on regulatory monitoring, control, and 
direction.
135
 Particularly in the case of a regulatory directive that conflicts 
with an entity‘s state law duties, it is difficult to imagine how such a 
conflict would not qualify for removal under the lower courts‘ analysis.136  
Despite the Eighth Circuit‘s attempt to characterize the regulatory 
relationship between the FTC and the tobacco industry as unique,
137
 its 
 
 
 135. This is because conflict preemption is raised as a defense where compliance with both state 
and federal law is impossible, or when the state law stands as an obstacle to the achievement of the 
objectives of Congress. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100–01 (1989). A common 
basis of a conflict preemption defense is based on the duty to comply with some federal regulation. See 
Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985). 
 136. If the action which is being sued upon under state law was an action taken pursuant to 
explicit federal directive, there is no question that there is an apparent conflict preemption defense 
available to the defendant. In fact, many courts struggled to reconcile their attempts to read the federal 
officer removal statute narrowly with the understandable inclination to permit federal jurisdiction on 
the basis of a conflict with an express directive. See supra Part III.B. The problem, of course, is that 
the courts conflated the necessity of using such a conflict as a grounds for summary judgment with the 
provision of federal jurisdiction. Although no court has explicitly mentioned it, it seems at least 
plausible that by creating this explicit directive exception, federal courts are showing their distrust that 
state courts will make the appropriate decisions at summary judgment, thereby necessitating the 
paternalistic grant of federal jurisdiction. 
 137. See, e.g., Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 420 F.3d 852, 863 (8th Cir. 2005) (Gruender, J., 
concurring).  
I write separately to emphasize that our decision today should not be construed as an 
invitation to every participant in a heavily regulated industry to claim that it, like Philip 
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decision would nevertheless have allowed removal in almost every state 
case where a defendant had a colorable conflict preemption defense based 
on compliance with either an express federal regulatory directive, or even 
a highly detailed, conflicting federal regulation. A pharmaceutical 
manufacturer sued in state court on a deceptive marketing or failure to 
warn theory, for example, would be able to remove under § 1442(a)(1) on 
the basis that in creating its product insert and marketing literature, it was 
―acting under‖ the FDA.138 Similarly, an automobile manufacturer sued in 
state court under a defective design theory could remove based on 
compliance with regulatory directives promulgated under the National 
Traffic and Motor Safety Act.
139
 While these would normally be 
arguments reserved for summary judgment based on conflict preemption, 
the rationale of the lower courts in Watson would transform the argument 
into one for removal at the jurisdictional phase of the case. 
D. Practical Implications of the Lower Courts’ Decisions 
Three main practical implications emerge from the lower courts‘ 
Watson decisions. First, the opinions flew in the face of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule and the Supreme Court‘s long history of refusing to grant 
federal question jurisdiction based on a federal defense.
140
 Defendants 
 
 
Morris, acts at the direction of a federal officer merely because it tests or markets its products 
in accord with federal regulations. . . . In this case, as the court‘s opinion makes clear, the 
FTC‘s direction and control of the testing and marketing practices at issue is extraordinary. 
Id. at 863–64. 
 138. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs‘ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 344–46 (2001) (outlining 
the thorough review process that pharmaceuticals and medical devices must go through at the hands of 
the FDA before they are permitted to enter the marketplace); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 
477 (1996) (explaining that the federally mandated premarket approval process for medical products is 
very rigorous). Given the high level of control by the FDA over its regulated agencies, it is no surprise 
that pharmaceutical manufacturers as well as medical device manufacturers have repeatedly attempted 
to remove based on § 1442(a)(1). See Jamison v. Purdue Pharma Co., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1315 (S.D. 
Miss. 2003); In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., 428 F. Supp. 2d 1014 
(D. Minn. 2006).  
 139. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000). In Geier, an injured motorist 
sued an automobile manufacturer under state tort law for negligently failing to equip the car with 
airbags. Id. at 865. The action conflicted with Department of Transportation standards requiring 
manufacturers to furnish some, but not all 1987 cars with airbags. Id. at 881. The Geier Court held that 
the state common law action was preempted by the federal regulation under the doctrine of conflict 
preemption. Id. at 886. Notwithstanding the fact that Geier is now mandatory authority for state courts, 
under the lower courts‘ Watson decisions, the mere appearance of conflict between the state tort law 
and the federal transportation regulations would have led to the removal of the case to federal court at 
the jurisdictional stage. 
 140. See supra text accompanying note 24; Tenn. v. Union & Planter‘s Bank, 152 U.S. 454 
(1894); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). 
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asserting a colorable conflict preemption defense would be able to remove 
and keep cases in federal court under § 1442(a)(1), even where all of 
plaintiffs‘ claims were based on state law. As a result, the federal courts 
would have been flooded with litigation that the Supreme Court has fought 
to keep in state court since the inception of its narrow reading of the 
federal question jurisdiction statute.
141
  
Of more direct importance to parties seeking relief under state law, 
plaintiffs would now be forced to pursue many state law claims in the 
federal courts. As mentioned above, empirical evidence suggests that 
federal courts offer a more favorable forum for defendants, particularly in 
cases removed from state court.
142
 In addition to more stringent rules of 
procedure and larger jury pools, defendants would also have the 
availability of review by federal appellate courts. Not only could this deter 
plaintiffs from bringing suit and seeking relief in the first place, it could 
also undermine the tort system of compensation, and encourage potential 
defendants to take greater risks in light of reduced deterrence incentives. 
Finally, important decisions on the balance between federal regulatory 
authority and private enforcement of state law would be in the hands of the 
federal courts.
143
 Because the lower courts‘ Watson decisions would 
funnel cases to federal court where an apparent conflict between state and 
federal law was already present, federal judges would be left to decide 
whether the asserted federal regulation in fact preempted the state law that 
formed the basis of plaintiffs‘ complaint. Given the higher likelihood of 
the federal judiciary asserting the primacy of federal law in the face of 
conflict,
144
 such a jurisdictional reshuffling may, in the long term, be 
expected to tilt the scales in favor of federal regulation at the expense of 
private litigation in state court. 
 
 
 141. Id. 
 142. See supra notes 37–38. 
 143. The uncalled-for shift of power to the federal government and the erosion of the police 
powers of the state have been cited as the primary reasons for a narrow reading of the federal officer 
removal statute in different contexts. See, e.g., Kristina L. Garcia, Comment, The Boyle Festers: How 
Lax Causal Nexus Requirements and the “Federal Contractor Defense” Are Leading to a Disruption 
of Comity Under the Federal Officer Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), 46 EMORY L.J. 1629 
(1997) (suggesting a narrow reading in the federal contractor context); Elizabeth M. Johnson, Note, 
Removal of Suits Against Federal Officers: Does the Malfeasant Mailman Merit a Federal Forum?, 88 
COLUM. L. REV. 1098 (1988) (suggesting a narrow reading in the criminal context). 
 144. See supra Part II.B. 
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V. SHUTTING THE DOOR FOR GOOD: THE SUPREME COURT‘S WATSON 
DECISION AND A FAMILIARLY ELUSIVE RATIONALE 
A. The Supreme Court Decision 
In light of the potentially serious ramifications of the Eighth Circuit‘s 
decision, it is no surprise that the Supreme Court granted the plaintiffs‘ 
petition for certiorari in Watson. Echoing both the Eighth Circuit and the 
Eastern District of Arkansas, the Court framed the question before it as 
―whether the fact that a federal regulatory agency directs, supervises, and 
monitors a company‘s activities in considerable detail brings that company 
within the scope of [§ 1442(a)(1)] and thereby permits removal.‖145 The 
Court noted that although its past decisions have instructed that the statute 
should be liberally construed, ―broad language is not limitless.‖146 The 
Court ultimately found those limits in the history, language, and purpose 
of the federal officer removal statute.
147
  
1. The History Rationale 
First, the Court traced the history of the predecessors of the modern 
federal officer removal statute, as well as the Court‘s interpretations of 
those previous versions.
148
 Noting that the earliest versions of the removal 
statute were enacted during times of particularly acute conflict between the 
federal government and the states, the Court suggested that the statutes 
were a vehicle for the vindication of the supremacy of federal law through 
the grant of federal jurisdiction to federal officers asserting immunity 
defenses.
149
 The presence of clauses in these early statutes granting private 
persons the same federal jurisdiction when those persons were ―acting 
under‖ the direction of federal officers revealed to the Court that the same 
considerations of supremacy and immunity could be present when a 
federal officer exercised control over a private person.
150
 Looking at its 
earliest federal officer removal cases involving private persons‘ use of the 
removal statute, Davis v. South Carolina
151
 and Maryland v. Soper,
152
 the 
 
 
 145. Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 127 S. Ct. 2301, 2304 (2007). 
 146. Id. at 2305. 
 147. Id. at 2305–08. 
 148. Id. at 2305–06. 
 149. Id. at 2306–07.  
 150. Id. at 2307. 
 151. 107 U.S. 597 (1883). 
 152. 270 U.S. 9 (1926). 
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Court concluded that, just as in those cases, in order for a private person to 
come within the scope of the ―acting under‖ clause, that person must be 
assisting a federal officer in the performance of his official duties.
153
  
2. The Plain Language Rationale 
Aiming to bolster the conclusion it drew from the history and judicial 
interpretation of the predecessors to the modern federal officer removal 
statute, the Court turned to a plain language analysis of the word ―under‖ 
as it pertains to the phrase ―acting under an agency of the United 
States.‖154 Citing a dictionary definition, the Court suggested that the word 
―under‖ must refer to what has been described as a relationship that 
involves ―‗acting in a certain capacity, considered in relation to one 
holding a superior position or office.‘‖155 Adding this plain language 
interpretation to its analysis of precedent and statutory history, the Court 
concluded that ―the private person‘s ‗acting under‘ must involve an effort 
to assist, or to help carry out, the duties or tasks of the federal superior.‖156 
Simply complying with the law, in the Court‘s view, did not satisfy this 
definition.
157
  
3. The Statutory Purpose Rationale 
Finally, the Court cited the purpose of the federal officer removal 
statute to validate its reading of the ―acting under‖ clause.158 The Court 
suggested that the fundamental purpose of the statute throughout its 
history was the protection of the federal government from interference 
 
 
 153. Watson, 127 S. Ct. at 2307. The Court also referred to a case that interpreted a related 
removal provision for the proposition that the statute only authorized removal by private parties if they 
were ―authorized to act with or for [federal officers or agents] in affirmatively executing duties under 
. . . federal law.‖ Id. (quoting City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 824 (1966)). This case 
involved an attempt by several defendants to remove criminal prosecutions instituted against them in 
federal court based on their assertion that in performing the acts giving rise to their prosecutions, the 
defendants were vindicating rights under the federal civil rights laws. Id. at 810–12. Despite the 
defendants‘ contention that they would be unable to obtain a fair trial in state court, the Supreme Court 
affirmed the Fifth Circuit‘s decision to remand the criminal cases for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. Id. at 824. 
 154. Watson, 127 S. Ct. at 2307.  
 155. Id. (citing 18 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 948 (2d ed. 1989)) 
 156. Id.  
 157. Id. The Court cites some examples of people who simply comply with federal laws or 
regulations but do not thereby ―help‖ or ―assist‖ the federal government, such as ―[t]axpayers who fill 
out complex federal tax forms, airline passengers who obey federal regulations prohibiting smoking, 
[and even] well-behaved federal prisoners.‖ Id.  
 158. Id. at 2307–08.  
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with its operations by hostile state courts.
159
 As the Court noted, ―[s]tate-
court proceedings may reflect ‗local prejudice‘ against unpopular federal 
laws or federal officials.‖160 In addition, ―States may deprive federal 
officials of a federal forum in which to assert federal immunity 
defenses.‖161 In light of these purposes, the Court felt that when a 
corporation complies with even highly detailed regulations, such 
compliance does not create a risk of state-court prejudice.
162
 In addition, 
keeping state lawsuits against such companies in state courts would likely 
not ―deny a federal forum to an individual entitled to assert a federal claim 
of immunity.‖163  
Ultimately, the rule that emerged from the Court‘s decision is that a 
highly regulated corporation cannot bring itself within the meaning of the 
statute simply by complying with highly detailed federal regulations, even 
when there is a high degree of federal supervision and monitoring.
164
 The 
Court felt that a contrary determination would open the federal courthouse 
doors to any highly regulated corporation sued in state court.
165
  
 
 
 159. Id. at 2306.  
 160. Id. (citing Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 32 (1926)). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. This statement by the Court raises the question of exactly what kind of prejudice would 
suffice to confer federal jurisdiction. The implication in the Court‘s statement is that the only prejudice 
that matters is the prejudice against the federal government itself, personified through an officer or 
agency of the United States. The Court ignores the more relevant contemporary issue of potential 
prejudice of state courts against the excessive encroachment of federal law and regulation.  
 163. Id. at 2308.  
 164. Id. This Note argues that, in fact, this is the real reason behind the Court‘s decision. Yet, like 
the Court‘s previous jurisprudence surrounding federal question jurisdiction and the well-pleaded 
complaint rule, the Watson Court relies on unconvincing rationales while obscuring the practical 
considerations that drive its decisions.  
 165. Id. The Court points to companies regulated by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) as examples of companies subject to highly detailed and specific regulations 
for whom an alternative holding on their part would open the doors to federal courts. Id. The Court 
also suggests that the FTC‘s regulation of Philip Morris is no different for federal officer removal 
purposes than the FDA‘s regulation of a pharmaceutical manufacturer. Id. at 2310. 
 In reaching its conclusion, the Court dismissed Philip Morris‘s reliance on federal contractor 
cases. Drawing an inherent distinction between the circumstances surrounding those cases and the 
ones in the case before it, the Court explained that when a private contractor is helping the government 
produce something that it needs, the contractor in essence helps the government fulfill its basic tasks. 
Id. at 2308. In the Agent Orange cases, for example, the defendant manufacturers was helping the 
government conduct an essential governmental task—conducting a war. Id. at 2308–09. Presumably, 
had there not been a private contractor, the government itself would have had to manufacture Agent 
Orange. The Court found this distinction sufficient for the present purposes, leaving open whether and 
when other government contractors could avail themselves of the benefits of the statute, and the 
corresponding protection of the federal courts. Id. 
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B. The Supreme Court’s Rationales Equally Support of the Opposite 
Conclusion 
1. The History Rationale 
The Court‘s historical argument rests primarily on the previous 
incarnations of the federal officer removal statute and its early judicial 
opinions interpreting those respective versions. The first federal officer 
removal statutes were enacted shortly after the formation of the 
Republic.
166
 At that time, the federal government was just starting to take 
shape and was therefore very limited in the scope of its operations. The 
states were largely recalcitrant to any assertion of federal authority that 
undermined traditional notions of state sovereignty. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, the two principal areas of federal control at the time, over 
international trade and over the collection of federal taxes, became the 
subjects of the earliest state-federal conflicts. Consequently, the original 
federal officer removal statutes were narrow, and applied at first only to 
federal customs officers, and later to federal revenue collectors.
167
 
Seeking to trace the history of the ―acting under‖ clauses of the early 
federal officer removal statutes, the Court looked to two early cases that 
involved private persons assisting federal revenue officials in arresting 
illegal distillers. In both of those cases, the rule emerged that where a 
private person assists a federal revenue officer in the performance of his 
official duties, he has ―acted under‖ that officer and therefore deserves the 
protection of the federal courts in state lawsuits arising from that 
assistance.
168
 The Court, in turn, took these early determinations of what 
conduct qualifies as ―acting under‖ a federal officer, and suggested that 
these decisions limit a private actor‘s access to § 1442(a)(1) to similar 
circumstances.
169
  
The Court‘s reliance on these early cases in its reading of the ―acting 
under‖ clause in § 1442(a)(1) is misguided. First, neither Davis nor Soper 
purported to address what actions by a private person will not qualify for 
federal officer removal.
170
 There are no bright lines drawn in those 
decisions and, in fact, there had been no Supreme Court case prior to 
 
 
 166. See supra Part III.A. 
 167. See supra notes 54–55 and accompanying text; Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969). 
 168. Watson, 127 S. Ct. at 2306–07 (citing Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U.S. 597 (1883) and 
Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9 (1926)). 
 169. Id. at 2307. 
 170. See Davis, 107 U.S. 597; Soper, 270 U.S. 9 (neither case addresses what conduct will not 
qualify to ―act under‖ a federal officer). 
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Watson that held that any person was not ―acting under‖ a federal officer 
for purposes of any version of the removal statute. Thus, while Davis and 
Soper are instructive on what conditions are sufficient to ―act under‖ a 
federal officer, they are completely silent on what conditions are necessary 
for removal.
171
 The Court‘s suggestion that these cases make the assistance 
of a federal officer in the performance of his official duties a necessary 
condition for removal is not accurate.  
Furthermore, the Court‘s reliance on interpretations of the early 
versions of the federal officer removal statute promulgated in the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century ignores the radically 
different conditions surrounding the enactment of those statutes. First, the 
size of the federal government and the scope of federal encroachment into 
the traditional police powers of the state were miniscule at the time of the 
earlier statutes‘ enactments.172 The size of the federal government and the 
pervasiveness of federal regulation during the second half of the twentieth 
century are overwhelming by comparison. Second, the early statutes 
specifically limited private persons entitled to removal to those ―acting 
under‖ federal customs officials and federal revenue collectors.173 This 
essentially restricted the scope of ―acting under‖ to the exact situations 
that the early cases addressed. By contrast, § 1442(a)(1) provides for 
removal for persons ―acting under‖ federal agencies. The scope of ―acting 
under‖ that is possible with respect to a federal agency is not only greatly 
expanded compared to the early versions of the statute, but the kind of 
―acting under‖ that the Court suggests is necessary from its reading of 
Davis and Soper seems counterintuitive. Namely, it is difficult to imagine 
how a private person can assist a federal agency in the performance of its 
official duties. Ultimately, the Court‘s conclusory statement that the early 
history of the federal officer removal statutes supports its narrow reading 
of § 1442(a)(1) is not persuasive. 
 
 
 171. Chief Justice White made an analogous argument in his dissent in Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The plurality held the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1978 unconstitutional under Article III in part because three categories of permissible Article I 
courts emerged through the Court‘s prior cases, and the newly established bankruptcy courts did not fit 
into any of those three categories. Id. at 70–71 (plurality opinion). Justice White chastised the plurality 
for assuming those three categories defined the outer limits of constitutional authority because without 
articulating unifying principles, the decision rested on the simplistic rationale that bankruptcy courts 
were unconstitutional simply because they did not look enough like the three previously approved 
Article I categories. Id. at 105 (White, J., concurring). 
 172. See generally William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 1863–
1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333 (1969). 
 173. See supra Part III.A. 
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2. The Plain Language Rationale 
Perhaps reluctant to base its conclusion solely on the history and early 
interpretations of the previous incarnations of the federal officer removal 
statute, the Court turned to alternative rationales to support its decision. 
One readily available was that of plain language. If the plain language of 
the term ―acting under‖ could support the Court‘s narrow reading based on 
an incomplete analysis of statutory history, maybe the Court‘s decision 
would carry greater persuasive weight. 
In fact, the Court found just such support by looking at the dictionary 
definition of the term ―under.‖174 ―Under,‖ the Court suggested, ―must 
refer to what has been described as a relationship that involves ‗acting in a 
certain capacity, considered in relation to one holding a superior position 
or office.‘‖175 The Oxford English Dictionary, in the Court‘s eyes, settled 
the plain language issue, and coupled with the Court‘s contention that the 
history of the statute necessitates that a private person be assisting or 
helping to carry out the official tasks of the federal superior, led the Court 
to conclude that simply complying with federal agency directives did not 
equal ―acting under‖ that agency.176 
Here too, the Court‘s analysis fails to persuade. Specifically, the 
Court‘s interpretation of the term ―under‖ is both arbitrary and contrary to 
the plain language understanding of the term when applied to ―acting 
under‖ a federal agency. Acting under an agency can equally mean acting 
―subject to the authority, direction, or supervision‖ of that agency.177 The 
Court provides no arguments in support of what is clearly a case of forum 
shopping for the most favorable dictionary definition.
178
 Its arbitrary 
selection of a particular definition lends no credibility to the conclusion 
that the definition is used to support. 
 
 
 174. Watson, 127 S. Ct. at 2307. 
 175. Id. (quoting 18 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 948 (2d ed. 1989)). 
 176. Id. 
 177. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER‘S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, 2059 (2d ed. 1997). See also 
WEBSTER‘S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2487 (2002) (acting under means to act 
―subject to the bidding or authority‖ that person); WEBSTER‘S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 2765 (2d ed. 1958) (under indicates a position of ―subjection, guidance, or 
control‖). 
 178. See generally Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme 
Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998) (examining the use of dictionary definitions in recent Supreme 
Court decisions and arguing that such use is selective, inconsistent, and tries to create a false sense of 
objectivity in statutory interpretation). The most likely scenario is that the Court had to search to find a 
definition that supported its conclusion and the Oxford English Dictionary did just that.  
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Furthermore, the Court‘s requirement that ―under‖ refer to a 
relationship akin to that of a subordinate employee to one holding a 
superior position or office seems to leave federal agency employees as the 
only potential private persons capable of ―acting under‖ a federal agency. 
But because federal agency employees are already considered federal 
officers who are entitled to remove under the statute, the Court‘s reading 
would merely be a repetition of an earlier portion of the statute. The Court 
chose not to address this rather obvious problem in its interpretation. In 
fact, it strains reason to suggest that complying with a regulatory directive 
such as that of the FTC to Philip Morris to include tar and nicotine 
numbers on all packages of all cigarettes could not be considered ―acting 
under‖ the FTC according the ordinary meaning of the phrase. Even absent 
an explicit directive, it is more than plausible to suggest that merely acting 
within the scheme of the pervasive regulation of the FTC over the tobacco 
industry comports with the ordinary meaning of ―acting under‖ the FTC. 
Thus, like its incomplete account of statutory history, the Court‘s attempt 
to reshape the language and meaning of the statutory text is unconvincing. 
3. The Statutory Purpose Rationale 
Finally, the Court suggests that the statutory purpose behind the federal 
officer removal statute—the protection of federal objectives from 
potentially hostile or prejudiced state courts—would not be advanced by 
permitting a corporation subject to detailed federal regulations to remove 
cases against it to federal court.
179
 Compliance with a regulatory order, 
according to the Court, ―does not create . . . a significant risk of state-court 
‗prejudice.‘‖180 Once again, this pronouncement by the Court is not only 
conclusory, but also cannot withstand logical scrutiny. 
First, if one accepts the premise that a state court is capable of bias 
against federal objectives, it is difficult to envision how the risk of that 
bias would not exist in a scenario comparable to that in Watson. 
Specifically, where a state court is faced with a federal defense such as 
preemption to an assertion of rights under state law, there is reason to 
believe that a state judge, as an instrument of the state‘s political structure, 
would look for ways to apply the state law rather than displace it in favor 
of federal law.
181
 In this sense, the state court might be biased against not 
 
 
 179. Watson, 127 S. Ct. at 2307–08 (2007). 
 180. Id. at 2307. 
 181. See, e.g., G. Merle Bergman, Reappraisal of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 46 MICH. L. 
REV. 17, 28 (1947) (There seems little doubt that . . . fear of local prejudice motivated the proponents 
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only the specific federal regulation, but also against the federal assumption 
of the police powers generally reserved to the states.
182
 The Court‘s 
attempt to limit potential bias that the federal officer removal statute 
guards against to bias against a particular type of defendant misses the 
point. Regardless of whether the defendant is a federal officer or a private 
person, the validity of the supremacy of federal law and regulation is an 
equally important federal interest. If state courts refuse to properly apply 
federal defenses, the entire system of federal regulation could be 
compromised as regulated entities would be subject to a patchwork of 
disparate state regulation in addition to that of the federal government. 
Furthermore, the Court suggests that its decision would not ―deny a 
federal forum to an individual entitled to assert a federal claim of 
immunity.‖183 Again, this statement presupposes that the federal interests 
protected by the removal statute are limited to the physical protection of 
officers or agents of the federal government. This reading directly 
conflicts with previous pronouncements by the Court that the statute 
protects from state court bias not only federal officials, but also unpopular 
federal laws.
184
 Moreover, the Court‘s limitation of the federal defenses 
that the statute was designed to protect solely to federal immunity defenses 
is misguided. The Court‘s previous jurisprudence required the averment of 
any colorable federal defense, not strictly the defense of official immunity. 
And in fact, the 1996 amendments to the statute recognized that 
§ 1442(a)(1) would provide a federal forum for ―important and complex 
federal issues such as preemption.‖185  
 
 
of the change in 1875. The late war had fanned the flames of sectional distrust so that considerations of 
this nature were greater than at any other time in the nation‘s history. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
legislation was introduced to meet the threat of local bias). 
 182. Watson, 127 S. Ct. at 2306–07. 
 183. Id. at 2308. 
 184. See, e.g., Maryland v. Soper, 270 U.S. 9, 32 (1926) (noting that the statute was designed to 
protect from potential local prejudice against unpopular federal laws and officials); Willingham v. 
Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 406 (1969) (noting that the statute prevents states from interference with 
federal government operations). 
 185. See H.R. REP. NO. 104–798, at 20 (1996) (Section 1442(a)(1) provides a federal forum for 
―important and complex federal issues such as preemption‖); 142 CONG. REC. S6517, S6519 (daily ed. 
June 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Grassley) (same). While it may not be wise to draw any firm 
conclusions about congressional intent from one terse statement in what was a very limited discussion 
of the amendment on the Senate floor, the statement at least makes more plausible the proposition that 
Congress intended § 1442(a)(1) to encompass conflict preemption scenarios. 
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C. The Driving Force Behind the Watson Decision is Federal Docket 
Control 
As noted above, commentators have long complained that the Court‘s 
decisions interpreting § 1331 and its development of the well-pleaded 
complaint rule lacked principle and merely disguised an attempt to limit 
the bourgeoning federal docket. Careful reflection on the Court‘s opinion 
in Watson reveals that its interpretation of § 1442(a)(1) suffers the same 
malady. In fact, the Court explicitly recognized it in the statement that ―[a] 
contrary determination would expand the scope of the statute 
considerably, potentially bringing within its scope state-court actions filed 
against private firms in many highly regulated industries.‖186 
In light of the growing prevalence of federal legislation and 
regulation,
187
 the potential for conflict between federal and state statutes, 
regulations, and common law is virtually limitless. Both state and federal 
courts are continually faced with motions for summary judgment based on 
federal preemption defenses as this rapidly developing body of law 
continues to evolve. In this context, the Court‘s decision is certainly 
justifiable in practical terms. Had the Eighth Circuit‘s decision been left 
untouched, virtually any conflict preemption defense based on a regulatory 
directive asserted by a highly regulated corporation would have qualified 
for removal under § 1442(a)(1). Indeed, the Court‘s decision in Watson 
parallels its creation of and continued adherence to the well-pleaded 
complaint rule. Just as § 1331 could have been broadly interpreted in light 
of its similarity to Article III, so too could § 1442(a)(1) have been 
interpreted broadly in light of its language and the interests it was 
designed to protect. In both cases, however, the alternative resolution 
would simply have produced an unworkable result.
188
 
 
 
 186. Watson, 127 S. Ct. at 2308. 
 187.  
In the twentieth century Congress increasingly relied upon conditional grants-in-aid to 
encourage states to implement its policies until 1965 when heavy reliance began to be placed 
upon preemption statutes which were enacted at the following pace: 14 (1900–1909), 22 
(1910–1919), 17 (1920–1929), 31 (1930–1939), 16 (1940–1949), 24 (1950–1959), 47 (1960–
1969), 102 (1970–1979), 93 (1980–1989), 83 (1990–1999).  
Zimmerman, supra note 25, at 375. 
 188. See supra note 49. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The judicial opinions in the Watson case, from the district court all the 
way to the Supreme Court, appear to focus narrowly on an often 
overlooked congressional grant of federal jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1442(a)(1). Indeed, a perfunctory reading of the Supreme Court decision 
might lead one to wonder whether the holding is really all that important 
in the grand scheme of the allocation of jurisdiction between the state and 
federal courts. After all, § 1442(a)(1) is called the federal officer removal 
statute, and the Supreme Court seemingly stated the obvious by holding 
that, aside from a few exceptional circumstances, the statute, and hence the 
federal courts, should only be available to officers or agencies of the 
United States government.  
Such a reading, however, misses the reality that the Watson case was 
far from simple, and was in fact yet another classic battleground for the 
resolution of the difficult issues that have plagued the field of federal 
jurisdiction for the past two centuries. Specifically, the underlying concern 
of jurisdictional allocation—when a federal interest in a particular case is 
sufficient to warrant its resolution in a federal forum—was again called 
directly into question. While the Court had answered previously that a 
federal defense of conflict preemption is not a sufficient interest for 
federal jurisdiction with respect to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the answer to the 
same question in the context of § 1442(a)(1) was by no means 
preordained. While the Watson Court did ultimately reach the same result 
with respect to § 1442(a)(1), it is important to recognize that the very 
rationales relied on by the Court to support its decision could just as easily 
be used to support the opposite conclusion.  
Specifically, the history of the federal officer removal statutes reveals 
that they were designed to address precisely the kinds of state-federal 
conflicts that are present in conflict preemption cases. The aim of the 
removal statutes has always been to direct the resolution of such conflicts 
to a forum that respected the authority and supremacy of federal law. The 
inclusion of private persons ―acting under‖ federal officers in both the 
historical and contemporary versions of the statutes is an affirmation that 
these same state-federal conflicts can exist even where the defendant 
himself is not a federal officer, but an entity subject to the supervision and 
control of that officer.  
Similarly, the plain language and ordinary meaning of the term ―acting 
under‖ certainly does not foreclose the possibility that a person acting 
under the supervision, control, and direction of a federal agency is ―acting 
under‖ that agency. Indeed, if anything, the plain language of the statutory 
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provision supports an even more expansive reading of the grant of federal 
officer jurisdiction than that outlined by the lower courts in Watson. The 
term ―acting under‖ could potentially encompass even a corporation that is 
simply acting subject to a regulatory scheme developed by a federal 
agency. Thus, a high level of detailed and direct control by a federal 
officer or agency over the specific action of the private person need not be 
a prerequisite under a plain language analysis. 
Finally, the purpose of the federal officer removal statute, the 
prevention of interference by hostile state courts with unpopular federal 
laws and officials, appears to support the lower courts‘ extension of the 
benefits of federal jurisdiction to private persons following the direction of 
federal officers, particularly when those directions carry the weight of 
federal law. Contrary to the Supreme Court‘s assertion, allowing a federal 
court to rule on a conflict preemption defense when the very vitality of 
federal regulation is at stake would certainly promote the purposes of the 
statute. 
Ultimately, the Court‘s analysis, if not its actual decision, is regrettable. 
Left intact, the Eighth Circuit decision would not only have opened the 
federal courthouse doors to many highly regulated defendants, but also 
would have altered the balance of power both between plaintiffs and 
defendants, and state and federal governments. In lieu of these significant 
consequences, the Court‘s holding cannot seriously be questioned in 
practical terms. What is ultimately unsatisfying, however, is the Court‘s 
decision to once again engage in a game of hiding the ball.  
Michael E. Klenov
 
 
  J.D. (2009), Washington University School of Law; B.A. Economics, International Studies 
(2005), Northwestern University. I would like to thank my Mom and Steve Tillery, two sources of 
unwavering support and inspiration, without whom neither this Note nor this author would be here 
today.  
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
